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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Quinn Millet, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. Appellate Case No. 20051106 
Logan City, Ds Bridgerland Apartments, 
Inc., and Cache Auto Booting Service, 
Defendants and Appellees 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L FUENTES IS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT 
The foundation of the case of Appellant ("Millet") is that the booting 
ordinance of Appellee Logan City ("the City") and the relationship of Millet, the 
City and the Appellees D's Bridgerland Apartments, Inc. and Cache Auto Booting 
Service ("private parties") under that due-process-depriving ordinance are, in 
every material respect, either analogous to or more egregious violations than the 
factors in the due-process-depriving state statutes and positions of the plaintiffs, 
states and private defendants in the landmark United States Supreme Court case of 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh 'g denied, 409 U.S.902 (1972). 
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The private parties erroneously attempt to distinguish this case from 
Fuentes by first asserting that four "chiefly relied on" cases, designated by asterisk 
in the table of authorities of their brief, support their claim that they were not 
engaged in "state action" and were not "acting under the color of authority of state 
law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These cases all directly or indirectly relied on 
Fuentes and distinguished the facts as later discussed. The City also erroneously 
relies on the two United States Supreme Court cases to support its claim that it 
was not a state actor. The private parties, in apparent recognition of the futility of 
their arguments, in the end assert: 
Furthermore, the status of Fuentes as controlling precedent has been in 
question for more than 30 years, with Justice Powell's concurring opinion 
that "Fuentes ... is overruled." 
P. 19 of private parties' brief (citing Mitchell v. W.T.Grant Co, 416 U.S. 600 at 623 
(1974)). 
The false impression this statement creates when applied to this or any 
other case not involving secured commercial transactions becomes apparent when 
the omitted part of the quotation is supplied: 
In sweeping language, Fuentes enunciated the principle that the 
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires an adversary 
hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any 
possessory interest in tangible personal property, however brief the 
dispossession and however slight his monetary interest in the property. The 
Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that 
principle and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is 
overruled." 
Mitchell v. W.T.Grant Co, 416 U.S. 600 at 623 (1974). 
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This minority dictum comment of Justice Powell, at most, would allow a 
post-taking hearing in some cases related to basic creditor-debtor agreements not 
involved in this booting case, which Justice Powell alone felt the sweeping 
language of Fuentes foreclosed, but was allowed in Mitchell. The majority 
correctly ruled that Fuentes expressly left the door open to the validity of the 
Mitchell-type post-seizure hearings. The City's booting ordinance fails to provide 
either pre- or post-seizure hearings and also violate due process in every other 
essential element identified by Fuentes. The towing and booting cases in accord 
with these principles have allowed an otherwise constitutional ordinance to stand 
muster only if a prompt post-taking administrative hearing, in conformity with 
other due process requirements, is provided. Many of the cases like Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), cited by the City also rely on Fuentes and set the 
conditions justifying a post-taking versus pre-seizure hearing in otherwise 
constitutional ordinances. Even if this booting ordinance had provided a due 
process post booting hearing it would have failed the Fuentes and Mathews test 
because the ordinance gave the initial booting decision to a private booter rather 
than a required public official. The private parties ignore the fact that many of 
their cited cases on all these critical issues expressly acknowledge that Fuentes is 
the controlling precedent, has never been overruled, and has consistently and 
repeatedly been reconfirmed. The private parties' claim that the value of Fuentes 
as controlling precedent "has been in question for over 30 years" is not true. 
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n. THE PRIVATE PARTIES' "CHIEF CASES" ALL SUPPORT MILLET 
The four federal case authorities on which the private parties "chiefly 
relied," when correctly analyzed, are expressly in accord with Fuentes. Those 
cases establish that the private parties booting of Millett's car pursuant to the 
unconstitutional ordinance were state actors "acting under the color of authority of 
state law" within the meaning of Section 1983. 
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the plaintiffs 
Section 1983 complaint alleged that a creditor acted jointly with the state in 
depriving him of his property without due process without specifying which 
theory. The complaint was dismissed by both the District and Circuit courts. The 
Supreme Court held that his complaint presented a valid cause of action that the 
creditor acted under the color of authority of state law insofar as he challenged 
constitutionality of the Virginia statute, but not insofar as he alleged only misuse 
or abuse of that statute. Id, at 941-42. Though the state was not a defendant as 
the City is in this case, it necessarily follows, contrary to the City's argument, that 
the state was a "state actor" in adopting the unconstitutional statute that gave the 
private defendants the "authority" they relied on in booting plaintiffs car. In this 
respect the complaint here alleges that the private parties seized Millet's car under 
the color of authority of the unconstitutional city ordinance. No claim was made 
that they were violating the unconstitutional ordinance. The City's reliance on 
Lugar to distance it from "state action" is even more obviously misplaced in view 
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of the following quote from Lugar. 'the procedural scheme created by the statute 
obviously is the product of state action." Id, at 941 
The City's and private parties' "chief reliance on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 
436 U.S. 149 (1978) can be disposed of from excerpts from the extensive analysis 
of Flagg provided in Lugar. In both cases the Court determined the application of 
"state action" and "color of authority of state law" in the limited context of pre-
judgment liens and sales under landlord liens. The ruling was limited to cases 
where elements of title-lien interests existed in the seizing-selling party prior to 
seizure-sale. No elements of pre-seizure lien or title are present in the booting-
towing cases. In Lugar, the Supreme analyzed Flagg and provided a 
comprehensive framework for analysis of state action and color of law in the many 
varied circumstances to which those terms are applied as follows: 
The response of the Court, however, focused not on the terms of the statute 
but on the character of the defendant to the § 1983 suit: Action by a private 
party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to 
justify a characterization of that party as a "state actor." The Court 
suggested that "something more" which would convert the private party 
into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case. This was 
simply a recognition that the Court has articulated a number of different 
factors or tests in different contexts: e,g, the "public function" test; the 
"state compulsion" test; the "nexus" test; and, in the case of prejudgment 
attachments, a " joint action test."21 Whether these different tests are 
actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the 
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court, in such a situation, 
need not be resolved here. 
21 The holding today, as the above analysis makes clear, is limited 
to the particular context of prejudgment attachment. 
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938-39. 
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As detailed in Millet's brief, he relies in part on the close "nexus" test, 
supported by the "Booter's letter" that the booting occurred under the color of 
authority of the Booting Ordinance. See Exhibit C to Affidavit of Quinn Millet, 
R. 154-156, Addendum to Brief of Appellant, tab 2. Millet couples reliance on the 
nexus test with the "public function" factor, as well as other factors included in his 
brief. The private parties' contend that the issue under the nexus / public function 
factors is whether "the enforcement of parking restrictions on private property is a 
function that has been 'exclusively reserved for the states.'" Private parties' brief, 
Pp. 11-12. The critical state function operative here is not general private property 
parking enforcement but rather the ordinance-delegated power to private profit 
seekers to summarily seize vehicles where the authorizing ordinance also makes 
resistance a crime. This is an exclusive government function. 
The other two cases that these private parties chiefly rely on also strongly 
support Millet's claims to their "color of authority." In Gallagher v. Neil Young 
Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995), the plaintiffs failed claim to 
"state action / under color of law" in a concert-entry pat-down search was not 
founded on the adoption of an unconstitutional law or regulation relied on by the 
private actors, as in this case and in Lugar. It was rather based on claimed 
participation of state officials in the individual searches, an entirely distinct 
circumstance than present in this case and in Lugar. Private action in reliance on 
an unconstitutional statute-ordinance is the valid nexus to private actor liability in 
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this case and in Lugar, bolstered by government function. Lugar is the basis 
Gallagher uses to identify and analyze the "several principles underlying the 
constitutional distinction between governmental action and private conduct" as 
quoted above. 
The last of the private parties' "chief cases" is Hinman v. Lincoln Towing 
Service Inc., Ill F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1985), which also strongly supports Millet's 
case in general and on two additional points. In Hinman, the plaintiff never 
claimed that the common-law towing of her car from private property was done 
under the color of authority of state law. On this point Hinman is illustrative but 
does not apply to Millet's claim to state action based not on common-law booting, 
but rather on booting pursuant to and expressly under the authority of the 
expansive due-process-violating city ordinance. Lugar and the hooter's letter 
strongly support this distinction. 
Hinman's failed claim that the tower (relocater) acted under the "color of 
state law" hinged on a claim that a state-wide statute giving a common-law tower 
a lien-holder property interest in a towed car to secure the payment of a towing fee 
deprived her of a due process pre-tow or prompt hearing on the validity of the 
towing. The court properly held that the ordering of property rights in the form of 
granting liens on property was strictly within the power of the state legislature and 
not restricted by due process. 
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No Utah State legislative act nor this City booting ordinance purport to give 
a private landlord (or other property owner) or its private booter a lien or any other 
property interest in a booted car to secure payment of a booting fee. If, arguendo, a 
lien interest were to be created by the state in behalf of common-law booters to 
collect a booting fee it would necessarily, under equal protection have to be by 
state-wide statute and not discriminate against common law booters in Utah 
outside Logan City. In this sense the ordinance might be viewed as creating an 
"illegal lien" under state law. In this regard the deputy County Attorney opined in 
the first council meeting that booting, as distinguished from towing, was "an 
illegal lien under state law". According to the minutes, he did not distinguish 
between common law booting and booting under the proposed expansive 
ordinance. As alludes to due process, however, he characterized booting as 
"unfair." Addendum, tab 1, exhibit B, ("Minutes"), p.l. In Hinman the state left 
the "standard setting" for towing to the common law where it necessarily must be. 
Logan City materially altered and expanded the common-law standards for 
booting by "setting standards for booting" in the ordinance. In those same minutes 
a council person did distinguish between prior common law booting and booting 
under the proposed ordinance when she stated "I don't like this kind of tool being 
used on behalf of the city" just before the "illegal lien" comment. Minutes, p. 1. 
In spite of repeated additional warnings that there might be legal-constitutional 
problems with the proposed ordinance threaded through the minutes covering over 
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fifteen months and nine council meetings considering booting, no one asked for, 
volunteered or provided any legal opinions addressing constitutional or other 
legality issues. The only chance the booting ordinance had of becoming legal and 
constitutional was by pure chance, not by due diligence of a city attorney. 
Contrary to the private parties' claim that their "chief reliance" cases 
support their arguments, in fact they strongly support Millet's claim that they were 
state actors acting under the color of authority of the unconstitutional ordinance. 
Also, those cases support and sustain the Supreme Court's landmark Fuentes case 
and expose the falsity of the claim that "the status of Fuentes as controlling 
precedent has been in question for more than 30 years". The Supreme court in 
Lugar and Flagg fully rely, elaborate and expand on Fuentes as controlling 
precedent and never "question" any part of it. The Circuit Courts in Gallagher 
and Hinman rely on Lugar and Flagg and never question their reliance on 
Fuentes. Every reported state and federal case where due process in towing-
booting statutes-ordinances is at issue cite and do not question Fuentes as the 
controlling precedent. These cases likewise defeat the City's claim that the 
adoption of the due process denying booting ordinance was not direct "state 
action". 
III. NEW YORK LAW SUPPORTS MILLET'S CASE 
At the end of private parties' argument on Hinman at page 16 of their brief 
they state: "See also Forest Hills Gardens Corp v. Baroth. 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000 
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(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990 ) (holding that owner of private streets had legal right to 
immobilize unauthorized parked vehicles through the application of a boot and 
charge a redemption fee)." They claim this case is additional support for their 
erroneous view ofHinman. Baroth* s statement of New York "common law" 
versus expansive due process violating booting ordinances strongly supports 
Millet's claims. As with the towing in Hinman, the booting in Baroth was done 
strictly under the authority of the common law. Baroth at 1003-1004). It is well 
settled New York law that no due process towing or booting can be done pursuant 
to "permissive" ordinances unless the ordinance provides full due process 
including an official booting decision-maker, a post-seizure administrative hearing 
and other due process requirements. These and other due process elements are 
absent in the City's booting ordinance. This New York rule applies to ordinance-
authorized booting on both private and public property. The 1965 New York case 
of Fieldston Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of New York, 213 N.E.2d 436, 16 
N.Y.2d 267 (1965) clearly limits the extent to which an ordinance may effect the 
exercise of a common law right to tow-boot without violating due process. 
. . . since the City acknowledges that its parking regulations are 
'prohibitive' rather than 'permissive', we are not called upon to decide 
whether, under the Federal and State Constitutions, it may sanction parking 
on these privately owned streets over the plaintiffs objections. 
Id, at 268. It is clear under New York case law that an ordinance that goes beyond 
"prohibiting" and enters into "permitting" booting on private property (or public 
property), as the City's expansive ordinance does, violates due process unless full 
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due process is provided in the ordinance. Millet's brief details the numerous 
"permissive" elements in this booting ordinance as that term is used in Fieldston. 
Others are treated later. The reported Rochester City Court case of Haefner v. 
Apcoa Parking, 500 N.Y.2d 605; 130 Misc. 2d 203 (1986) is the only reported 
New York case challenging the constitutionality of local New York towing-
booting ordinances and rounds out relevant New York booting-towing law. 
Haefner, in strong terms, finds that the city ordinance and county regulation of 
towing violate due process. It analyzes and applies Fuentes to facts analogous to 
this booting ordinance and lumps towing and booting together. It lays much of the 
blame to the failure of the city and county attorneys to review these pre-Fuentes 
laws and make them conform to Fuentes. As noted above in this case, as the 
Council minutes establish, prior to adoption of this post-Fuentes ordinance there 
was no review of extant legal or constitutional requirements by the City Attorney's 
office, though many questions were raised that should have triggered such a 
review. 
IV. ABDICATION OF POLICE POWER EXCEEDS FUENTES 
The Appellants argue that Fuentes is distinguishable regarding ordinance 
denial of due process and "color of state law" because under the unconstitutional 
replevin statutes, state officers ministerially issued and executed writs of replevin 
initiated solely by the creditors without any intervening judicial review. The 
private parties repeatedly argue that because public officials do not participate in 
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individual bootings under the ordinance, Fuentes does not apply. The fact that 
under this unconstitutional booting ordinance the police power decision to seize 
the vehicle is delegated directly to the private booter without any pretense of 
official action (ministerial or judicial), makes this ordinance a much more 
aggravated case of total abdication of police power than in Fuentes. See Fuentes, 
407 U.S. at 91-93. 
V. "NEXUS" TO ORDINANCE APPLIES, NOT "JOINT ACTION" 
Both the City and private parties repeatedly try to separate their actions from 
each other in terms of "state action" and "color of state law" by citing cases where 
"joint action" of officials and private parties is the claimed basis for private parties 
"acting under the authority" of state law as defined by Lugar and applied in 
Gallagher, and in which it was concluded there was no "joint action." The 
operative "circumstance" in this case is most clearly rooted in the Lugar "nexus" 
and "state function" factors and not "joint action." The booter was admittedly 
acting under the authority of the unconstitutional booting ordinance in booting 
Millet. It was the adoption this ordinance and not joint action of City officials in 
the bootings that was the direct "state action" of the City. The "state function" 
factor also bolsters this case as do the other factors detailed in Millet's brief. 
Lugar found the same allegations of "nexus" to an unconstitutional statute 
sufficient in holding the private parties. Though the state was not a party to 
Lugar, the court left no doubt that its adoption of the unconstitutional booting 
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procedural ordinance was direct state action: "[T]he procedural scheme created by 
the statute obviously is the product of state action." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941. 
VI- BOND REVERSAL SUPPORTS MILLET 
After claiming Fuentes is questionable, the private parties correctly point 
out that Millet's Brief quotes from and relies on the decision and dicta in a federal 
district court case that the case was reversed on appeal in Bond v. Danzer, 494 
F.2d 302 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974). The private parties' Brief at 
19, 20. Their conclusion that "Millet's reliance on this case, as overruled, 
supports the Trial Court's dismissal" is untrue. The opinion on appeal lends 
further support to Millet. The District Court found "state action" in the adoption 
of an unconstitutional state statute. Most of the Circuit Court's reversal was 
dedicated to finding that the state statute was constitutional. The decision 
continued on to explain why other later rationalizations of plaintiff for "state 
action" were not present under the facts of that case. That reversal came eight 
years before Lugar, which also concluded that an unconstitutional statute is 
"obviously" state action as discussed above. 
VIL THE TWO CHICAGO CASES ARE IRRELEVANT 
The private parties' final point regarding the state actors / color of law issue 
is in a paragraph that on its face makes no claim to resolving that issue or any 
other issue in this case. The private parties' Brief p. 18. The first case they cite is 
Saukstelis v. Chicago, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15298 (N.D.I11. 1989), also 1990 
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WL 147611. In paraphrasing the holding, they omit the critical aspect of the case 
that the injunction sought was preliminary, which posture of the case negates any 
relevance to the case at bar. They fare no better with the citation of Elliott v. 
Chicago, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8609 (N.D.I11. 1989), alsol989 WL 146711. The only 
bearing this case could have on Logan's booting ordinance would be regarding the 
part that authorizes police-ordered booting on public streets. That aspect has been 
specifically exempted from this complaint. 
VIII. MILLET'S RIGHTS IMPAIRED BY THE ORDINANCE 
At the end of the private parties' Brief (page 20) they argue that Millet's 
rights and remedies are not diminished by the ordinance. The explanations they 
give, when analyzed, show that Millet's constitutional right to due process is 
denied in the various contexts in which they make their arguments. On the one 
hand they deny that the ordinance makes no significant changes in common-law 
booting. In addition to the specifics in Millet's Brief, the private parties here focus 
on the fact that the ordinance creates a new specific Class B misdemeanor. 
Addendum, tab 1, Exhibit A ("Ordinance"), p.3. Contrary to their claims in 
general and their specific claim that the Ordinance only restates the common law 
of booting, this section is entitled: "Regulation of impounding and booting 
practices." Ordinance, p. 1. It provides multiple major changes in the common 
law, only some of which were focused on in Millet's short Brief. Ordinance, Pp. 
1-3. This ordinance-created impounding and booting crime is first raised in the 
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private parties' Brief. Contrary to their argument that only landlords and hooters 
are subject to the crime, and not the booted like Millet and others effected, the 
ordinance makes it clear that "Violation of any provision of this section (by 
anyone) is a Class B Misdemeanor." Under the common law the right to boot is 
exclusively vested in person who has been "specially injured" by the parking 
obstruction. In the landlord-tenant context as distinguished from commercial and 
customer parking, it is the tenant who has been rented a parking stall and not the 
landlord who suffers the special injury. See 39 AmJur2d, Highways, Streets, and 
Bridges, §§ 349, 353, 358, and 369. Here are some examples of how this special 
booting crime alone operates to profoundly change the common law of booting. 
Unintentional violations of common-law booting or interference with it are civil, 
not criminal matters. Under the common law, tenants with an assigned parking 
stall and landlords with less than 4 parking spaces could boot violators either 
personally or through a licensed or an unlicensed booter. Such tenants, landlords, 
and licensed or unlicensed booters are not only deprived of their common law 
booting rights but also become subject to prosecution for the special ordinance 
booting crime. However, common-law towing rights remain untouched by the 
ordinance. Commercial lot customer parking owners who had the right to directly 
boot or hire non-licensed booters are guilty of the crime if they exercise their 
common law right in this manner. On the other hand, landlords who have not 
personally suffered the "special injury" required for common law booting, are 
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permitted to initiate booting, not themselves, but only through specially licensed 
booters. The booted like Millett are subject to prosecution for the crime if they 
tamper with or remove the boot, even under circumstances covered in his Brief, 
where under the common law and criminal statutes, the booter would have been 
guilty of theft and extortion. The effect of this special booting crime clearly 
illustrates the permissive and common-law altering nature of the ordinance. If 
landlords and booters seize within the standards and rules provided in the 
ordinance they will not be guilty of the crime even when, by so booting, it would 
be a violation of their common law right. On the other hand when anyone, 
including the booted, and others who suffer "special injuries" boot and would be 
entitled to boot under the common law, exercise their common law rights, in 
violation of the booting ordinance, they are guilty of the special ordinance-created 
booting crime. 
The statement that Millet's right to "seek redress, damages, or whatever 
other solutions he may choose through small claims court or other courts available 
to him" somehow satisfies procedural due process is absurd. Private parties' 
Brief, p. 20. One of the critical elements required in ordinances effecting a 
deprivation of a right is that the ordinance itself provides a due process hearing. 
The notion that this due process hearing requirement is satisfied by a victim's right 
to pay the filing and service fees, initiate and prosecute a regular court case 
contradicts the express or implied holdings in all the cases cited in all the briefs 
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related to due process hearing requirements. Put in simple terms, if when Millet or 
others get a police issue parking violation citation, the ordinance provides that 
they may contest it in a due process hearing without initiating a separate court case 
and, paying fees that would far exceed the extorted $50.00 booting fee. Because 
the primary group of targeted victims were college students as evidenced by the 
Council minutes, this so called "remedy" is a useless sham. In this way the 
ordinance promotes extortion without any practical remedy for the targeted victim 
group. To suggest that a victim of booting has a due process hearing available in 
Court is like telling the owner of a garnished account that their right to sue the 
creditor for wrongful garnishment satisfies the due process requirement of 
providing a post-deprivation hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees have not provided this Court with any valid reason to uphold the 
trial court's dismissal of the complaint. This Court should reverse and remand the 
case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED June 27, 2006. 
$u 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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